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MUST A VENDOR INSPECT CHATTELS BEFORE
THEIR SALE? AN ANSWER
D. J. FARAGE*

Professor Laurence H. Eldredge recently published a very stimulating paper,
.devoted to a consideration of the liability imposed under tort law upon a vendor of
a chattel for harm resulting from its dangerous condition. While excluding discussion of problems involving those vendors who "manufacture, compound, pack,
-or otherwise create the finished product," Mr. Eldredge, in his usual, admirably
thorough way, considers virtually every phase of the liability of retailers and wholesalers and has sought to collect all available case authority pertinent thereto.
With his analysis of and conclusions about all phases of the subject but one,
I find myself in such substantial accord that any animadversion concerning these
would be hypercriticism. Thus, I have no fault to find with his summary concerning liability for personal injuries based on breach of warranty theories, nor
with the views he expounds under his subheadings entitled "Chattels Known to be
Dangerous," "Conscious Misrepresentation of Source," "Reckless Misrepresentation of Chattel's Safety," and "Honest Misrepresentation of Chattel's Safety." On
only one basic point which Mr. Eldredge makes do I feel doubt, but that point is of
such major importance that, notwithstanding my reluctance to question his generally sound judgment, I feel impelled to pause, if not to cross lances on the matter.
If I rightly understand the position argued for by Mr. Eldredge, it is that a
vendor of a chattel, if free from "active" negligence, is not liable to a purchaser or
third party for personal injuries resulting from the fact that the chattel was in a
dangerous condition, even if the vendor could have discovered the danger through
a "reasonable" or even "cursory" examination of the article. In other words, the
suggestion seems to be that unless the vendor has himself produced the dangerous
condition, or is guilty of misrepresentation, he is not liable for personal injuries
unless he actually knew of facts indicating the danger and failed to warn the buyer.
To put the matter still differently, a vendor is not liable for harm suffered by yen*Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
'Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability (1941)

89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 306.
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dees or third persons merely because he could have discovered the danger by making an inspection previous to sale, no matter how little the burden of such inspection, nor how great the danger threatened by the condition of the chattel. "The
test," says Mr. Eldredge, "should be the vendor's actual knowledge of the defect
or of facts pointing to it, while the degree of observableness of the defect should
be merely evidence bearing upon the existence or non-existence of that controlling
fact."' In sum, the contention seems to be that a vendor owes, or at least should
owe, no duty to inspect a chattel before selling it.
The reasoning advanced to support this proposition invites examination. Says
Mr. Eldredge:
"Ordinarily, if a vendor is held liable for selling a chattel without
inspection, liability is being imposed not because he did a foreseeably
dangerous act, but because he omitted to do something. In other
words an affirmative duty to act is being imposed. Generally, affirmative obligations are imposed only as the price of a benefit. (Eg.,
the possessor of land owes a duty to a business visitor to inspect, but
only owes to other licensees a duty to warn of known defects: RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 342, comment c, and 343, comment
a.) I If it be said that the vendor benefits from the sale of a chattel,
it may also be said that the primary benefit of using the chattel ac4
crues to the purchaser."'
The effort in the last sentence to minimize the economic benefit accruing to a
vendor in carrying on his trade leaves me unimpressed. The vendee's interest in
acquiring and using a chattel cannot gainsay the vendor's interest in making the
sale. By and large, vendors are not in business because they are charitably disposed. The one benefiting the most is perhaps he striking the best bargain. Both,
however, are economically interested in the sale. In any event, I find difficulty in
understanding why, although the vendor is conceded by Mr. Eldredge to have sufficient economic interest in his trade to justify the imposition of a duty to make a
"reasonable" inspection of the premises for the protection of customers, the same
vendor is deemed not to have a sufficient economic interest in the same trade which
may justify the imposition of a duty to "reasonably" inspect stock for the benefit
of the same customers. There may be other reasons, perhaps, for imposing the
duty in the one case and denying it in the other, but the absence of benefit to the
vendor seems a doubtful basis for distinction.

2id. at 329.

3id. at 321, footnote 76.
4id. at 321.
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The article continues:
"If that use benefit 5 is not strong enough to raise a duty of inspection
by the purchaser, why should the sale benefit be sufficient to raise a
duty of inspection by the vendor? If the purchaser's belief that the
chattel is free from defects is reasonable, so that his use without inspection is not negligent as to a third person or contributory negligence as to himself, how can it be said that the vendor's equally reasonable belief and sale without inspection is n'egligence? After all,
the risk of harm is to the purchaser, not to the vendor." 6
To begin with, this statement suggests that the vendee of a dangerous chattel is
under no obligation to make any reasonable examination for himself before using
the chattel. No cases, however, are cited in support, and the point is not conceded.
It would seem that a vendee injured while using a chattel because of a defect therein is guilty of contributory negligence if he omits a reasonable inspection which
would have disclosed the danger.1 On the other hand, it may well be that to be
"reasonable" the vendor's inspection must be more thorough than that which the
vendee must reasonably make to avoid the charge of contributory negligence. A
difference in the degree of thoroughness in the inspection required of vendor and
vendee respectively of itself does not establish unfair discrimination. Equitable
considerations may justify greater demands upon one than upon the other. It is
not unreasonable to suppose that one in the business of constantly handling and
selling specified chattels should be able to discover defects of more varieties, more
easily and quickly than a vendee making only occasional purchases of such chattels
and lacking the ready ability to spot defects which comes from long experience.
To say, therefore, that if a vendee is not guilty of contributory negligence in
failing to discover defects, the vendor is entitled to like exoneration for failing to
discover the same defects, begs the issue. If for reasons of economic or social
policy, a duty is imposed upon a vendor to do more than is required of the vendee,
conformance by the former with the standards set up for the latter will not suffice.
The real question is whether fairness requires the imposition of identical standards
on both. It is not uncommon to demand more rigorous precautions from one pursuing a business calling than from his patrons. This principle is recognized by the
RESTATEMENT' when it states:

Sie., the vendee's.
6EIdredge, supra note 1, at 321.
7Semble Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907); cf. VanLien v. Scoville
Mfg. Co., 14 Abb. Prac. (N.S.) 74 (N.Y. 1873) ; BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS, (1926)
118 (intimation). As to duty of vendee to inspect for the benefit of third persons, compare RETORTS, §307, comment b, quoted infra, note 9.
STATEMENT,
8
RESTArEMeNT, TORTS (1934)

§343, comment/.
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"A person who holds his land open to others for his own business
purposes must possess and exercise a knowledge of the dangerous
qualities of the place itself and the appliances provided therein,
which is not required of his patrons. Thus, the keeper of a boarding
house is negligent in providing a gas stove to be used in an unventilated bathroom, although the boarder, who is made ill by the fumes,
uses the bathroom with knowledge of all the circumstances, except
the risk of so doing. This is so because the boarding house keeper,
even though a man of the same class as his boarders, is required to
have a superior knowledge of the dangers incident to the facilities
which he furnishes to them." 9
Accordingly, the mere fact that a vendee may be entitled to ignore certain risks in
using a chattel does not and should not necessarily absolve the vendor from a duty
to inspect the chattel before sale, if by hypothesis, it is deemed equitable to require
superior knowledge on his part. To be sure, the boarding house case put by the
RESTATEMENT concerns the duty to inspect business premises, not chattels. Mr.
Eldredge, however, has sought to distinguish the chattel cases by minimizing the'
benefit accruing therein to the vendor. If, as I have contended, the vendor's benefit is the same in the two situations, there appears to be no further argument advanced by Mr. Eldredge against applying the reasoning of the boarding house case
to situations involving sales of chattels, unless it be his suggestion that "it is doubtful"10 whether a vendee relies on the vendor's having made an inspection of the
purchased chattel. This point raises a question of fact which perhaps can never
be definitely settled.
It may be true that "in this age of national advertising and familiar tradeThis would
marks, the purchaser is equally likely to rely on the manufacturer.'"'
not prove, however, that there is not at least a partial reliance upon the retailer.
While, perhaps, a prospective purchaser of an automobile may be more likely to
concern himself with the identity of the manufacturer than of the retailer, it is
significant that the prospective purchaser is usually moved to deal with one particular retailer out of a group selling the same manufacturer's products. I know
9Italics added.

This illustration is based no doubt on Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 415,

Compare also RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §307, comment b: "If a third
135 AtI. 20 (1926).
person has turned over the thing to the actor for the purpose of his using it for the particular work
or similar work, the actor is usually entitled to assume that the thing is in normally fit condition
unless there is some reason to suspect the ccntrary. On the other hand, there are certain relations,
of which that of Master and Servant is an instance, in which the actor is required to take reasonable
care to ascertain by inspection the actual character of a thing turned over to him by even a careful

person or bought of a reputable manufacturer. Even in the absence of such a special relation, there
is a similar duty of inspection where the work in hand threatens serious danger unless the instrumentalities used are appropriate and in good condition."
10Eldredge, supra note 1, at 321.

Ilibid. Italics added.
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many people who insist on dealing with a particular individual retailer even when
buying trademarked products which this retailer sells at prices slightly above those
elsewhere, because he has established a reputation for fastidious care that even such
products must be completely free of imperfections when he sells them.
Perhaps no generalization that vendees always do or do not rely on the vendor
can be validly made. In certain specific cases, such reliance is undoubtedly present.
In others a purchaser may ask for a trademarked product without even a thought
as to whom he is relying upon for inspection of the chattel, just as a purchaser
often enters business premises without any expectation that dangers lurk therein,
and so without any conscious reliance upon the possessor or anyone else for antecedent inspections. In such cases, the only intelligible inquiry which might be
pursued is not upon whom did the vendee rely, but upon whom would he have
relied had he thought about the matter? It is submitted that a rule of law absolving vendors from any duty to inspect chattels is unjustified insofar as it rests on
the doubtful, debatable, and undemonstrable factual basis that vendees do not rely
on the vendor.
THE AUTHORITIES

After advancing the arguments already considered, Mr. Eldredge states:
"Because of these reasons and until quite recently, it has generally
been thought that a vendor had no duty of inspection; and that he
was not liable (in the absence of a warranty) for harm caused by a
defect which should have made him suspicious."12
Making an endeavor to "cite and analyze every case relating to a vendor's purely
tort duty which could be found in the reports"' 13 and reviewing the RESTATEMENT,
he concludes that:
"... it is difficult to see why the public welfare requires the imposition upon vendors of this new duty of inspection. On the contrary
it requires continued adherence to the present weight of authority."' 4
Conceding the claimed thorough scope of Mr. Eldredge's research, I nevertheless wish to dispute the conclusions he draws therefrom as to the effect of the
decisions and the "weight of authority." The cases he relies upon are collected
on pages 322 and 323 of his article. There it is alleged that "there is a considerable body of case law in which vendors who did not inspect chattels, which by
reason of hidden defects caused harm, have been absolved from liability." No
12id. at 322.
Isid. at 334.
14ibid. Italics added.
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cases are cited at this point. The next sentence continues, "In a number of cases
the defect was not detectable by an ocular inspection and could have been disclosed
only by thorough testing." In support of this statement seventeen cases are cited.
These, however, obviously do not support the view that a vendor owes no duty to
inspect chattels. At best they hold that the duty to inspect must not be "unreasonably" onerous. Indeed, the next sentence of the article concedes this to be so by
saying, "As to these cases it may be said that the vendor could not have discovered
the defect even if he had used 'reasonable care' in inspecting them." Up to this
point, therefore, Mr. Eldredge fails to cite any holding in support of his view. He
does thereafter refer to dicta in seven cases' " upholding his position, at the same
time conceding, however, that other cases use language which might be construed
against his position. The dicta are therefore not persuasive either way.
Finally, Mr. Eldredge states" flatly that "In two cases involving observable
defects but in which the vendor did not inspect and learn of them, he was held not
to have any such duty." These cases, Longmeid v. Holliday17 and Moore v. Jefferson D. & D. Co.,' 8 it is respectfully submitted, do not support the text.
In Longmeid v. Holliday, defendant vendor sold a defective lamp to A, whose
wife, B, suffered harm because of the defect. There is no statement in the report
that the defect was reasonably observable. Recovery against the vendor was denied to B in kh action alleging deceit (i. e., "intentional fraud") because no fraud
was proved. Any language in the opinion bearing on the point for which Mr.
Eldredge cites the case must therefore be regarded as dictum. It is noteworthy,
however, that in denying recovery, the court stressed that the plaintiff was not a
party to the contract. Parke, B., states, "There are other cases besides those of
fraud in which a third person, though not a party to the contract, may sue for the
damage sustained if it be broken. These cases occur where there has been a wrong
done to that person for which he would have had a right of action, though no such
contract had been made," but he states further that there is no actionable wrong in
the absence of contractual privity, where the transfer involves "an article not in its
nature dangerous, but which might become so by a latent defect entirely unknown,
though discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care even by the person who manufactured it."'19 There is much in this language which points, not so much to the
idea that a vendee owes no duty to inspect, as to the policy later announced by the
now discredited case of Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co. 20 to the effect that
a transferor of a chattel is liable for personal injuries suffered by one not in con15id. at 322, footnote 81.
'Gid. at 323.
176 Ex. 761 (1851).
18169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930).
19Italics added.
20120 Fed. 865 (C.C.A. Mo., 1903).
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tractual privity, only if the case falls within the three classic exemptions announced
by Judge Sanborn, one being the case of a chattel which is "imminently dangerous
to life or limb." Indeed, in the Huset case Judge Sanborn specifically cites and
relies upon Longmeid v. Holliday. That case lends but doubtful support, therefore, to Mr. Eldredge's contention.
The second case he cites as definitely denying the vendor's duty to discover
observable defects, Moore v. Jefferson, involved a sale by A to B of steel drums.
B had previously contracted to procure and to sell them to C. While C was inspecting one of the drums, B "negligently" brought a lighted match near the
bunghole, causing an explosion which killed C. In a suit against A on the theory
that A failed to make an inspection of the drums before the sale to B, which would
have disclosed the presence of inflammatory gases, recovery was denied. But the
decision does not turn on the theory that a vendor owes no duty to inspect chattels.
The court emphasizes that "There was, in fact, no contractual relationship of any
kind existing between defendant and decedent. . . . We are dealing here with a
case in which privity of contract is absent.'' 1 Quoting from an earlier case, the
court continues:
"The duty owing to the public for breach of which one injured may
recover, has respect to and is limited to instruments and articles in
their nature calculated to do injury, such as are essentially and in their
elements instruments of danger, and to acts that are ordinarily dangerous to life and property. If the wrongful act be not imminently
dangerous to life or property, the negligent vendor is liable only to
22
the party with whom he contracted."
Again, the tneory is simply that of the Huset case. Moreover, the court holds that
B's striking of the match was a superseding cause of the injury. In short, Moore
v. Jefferson does not in the least hold that a vendor is under no duty to inspect
chattels he sells.
Up to this point, therefore, Mr. Eldredge still fails to cite a single case
holding for his proposition. The only other case he cites anywhere in his article,
so far as I have been able to discover, which might be construed to support him
is Miller v. Svenson.23 There a vendor of a fur coat admittedly inspected it, but
failed to discover a furrier's knife which was concealed in the lining and later hurt
the vendee. Recovery was denied because:
"The evidence does not show that the failure . . . to discover that
there was a knife concealed in the coat was caused by any failure on
21126 So. 691, 693 (1930).
22ibid. Italics the court's.
23189 Il. App. 355 (1914).
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the part of the defendants to use reasonable and ordinary care ...
The defendants were not bound to anticipate and search for that
which was unusual and unforeseen." 2 4
In short, this case, like the seventeen previously referred to, does not deny the existence of a duty to make a "reasonable" inspection, but goes on the ground that
the duty was fuffilled.
25
Beginning on page 330 of his article, Mr. Eldredge discusses three cases
which, he concedes, bold that the vendor is under a duty to inspect chattels he
sells. Since Mr. Eldredge fails to cite a single case flatly holding for his views,
it is difficult to understand his suggestion that the requirement of inspection would
be a "new" duty26 and "contrary . . . to the present weight of authority."2 7 His
criticism of the first two of these cases, on the ground that the particular inspection
required in the specific instances was "unreasonably" onerous, may be conceded to
lye soutid. That criticism in itself, however, does not invalidate the argument for
imposing at least a "reasonable" duty. Similarly, the contention that all three
cases requiring inspection rest upon dubious precedents may be accepted without
reflecting upon th- wisdom behind the requirement. After all, since there appear
to be relatively few decisions which squarely raise the question, the courts could
hardly be expected to cite other than more or less analogous cases.

Other authorities cited by Professor Eldredge as denying the existence of any
duty on the vendor to inspect are statements in Ruling Case Law and Corpus
Juris. 8 Neither of these, however, cites any cases not already considered by Mr.
Eldredge himself, and since neither of these books purports in itself to be an
exegesis on a sacred text, it would seem that the contention is not thereby furthered.
The views of the RESTATEMENT remain for consideration. After a minute
'examination of §§ 401 and 402, Mr. Eldredge concludes that a number of sentences and phrases, especially when viewed in the light of their context, must be
regarded as "misleading" and "unfortunate" expressions which were not intended
to be made, and which presumably were the result of faulty draftsmanship. Referring to a comment under § 401, which states that "the retailer is not subject to
liability for bodily harm caused by their defective condition, unless the condition is
such that even the cursory inspection which a dealer should make of any article

24id. at 356.
2
Garvey v. Namm, 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N.Y.S. 442 (1910); Santise v. Martins, Inc.,
258 App. Div. 663, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 741 (1940); Ebbert v. Phila. Elec. Co., 126 Pa. Super. Ct.
351, 191 Ali. 384 (1937), aff'd 330 Pa. 257, 198 At. 323 (1938).
Z6Eldscdge, supra note 1, at 334.
27ibid.
2824 R.C.L. 509, 510; 43

C.J.

893.
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which h'e puts in stock and sells, would disclose some indication that the goods had
deteriorated to a dangerous extent, ' '2 9 Mr. Eldredge says:
"If this means no more than that the vendor of canned goods, for
example, is liable when the defect has swollen the can to produce an
obvious bulge, there can be no real objection because it is practically
certain the bulge will be seen and that fact is a danger signal to the
30
vendor."
Similarly, with regard to the comment under § 402 that "the rule stated...
requires the wholesale and retail dealer to utilize . . .the special opportunities
which he has to observe the condition of the goods. . .," he comments:
"It can be argued that this requires the dealer to search for 'observable' defects. Taking the sentence in its context does not warrant
such a broad interpretation; nor does the rationale of a vendor's liability. If the evidence of the defect is plain on the outer face of the
chattel it is practicallycertain the vendor did know of it. His denial
will generally be met with incredulity by the jury just as the jury
views with incredulity the defendant's protestations of ignorance of
the falsity of his statements in a deceit action where the evidence
makes such ignorance highly improbable. But so far as the rule of
law is concerned the test should be the vendor's actual knowledge of
the defect or of facts pointing to it, while the degree of observableness of the defect should be merely evidence bearing upon the existence or non-existence of that controlling fact ... 31
The word "practically" in each of these quotations carries an implicit admission that there may be occasions when the vendor, though he might ascertain the
facts at a glance, actually has not done so. Thus, a merchant, while engrossed in
conversation with his customer, might pick a can of food from a recently delivered
and still unpacked carton and put it in a bag for the customer without giving the
particular can a glance. Likewise the case might be put of a sale from such a
carton by an inexperienced helper of the merchant. To say that the jury will not
believe the vendor's claim of ignorance when the defect is "observable," and that
in such case the merchant should or will be treated as though he had knowledge,
whether he did or not, is in effect to concede that at least in those cases the vendor
must make a reasonable inspection if he wishes to avoid liability.
29

RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)

§401, Comment a.

SOEldredge, rupra note 1, at 324.
81id. at 329. Italics added.

Italics added.
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Section 402 states in blacdetter:
"A vendor of a chattel manufactured by a third person is subject to
liability as stated in § 399,82 if, although he is ignorant of the dangerous character or condition of the chattel, he could have discovered
it by exercising reasonable care to utilize the peculiar opportunity
and competence which as a dealer in such chattels he has or should
have."83
To explain away the prima facie implication of this section, Mr. Eldredge refers to
a statement made by Professor Bohlen when the latter presented the draft8 ' of the
pertinent sections to the American Law Institute. Mr. Bohlen said:
"I don't think there is any doubt about it that if I buy a chattel from
a reputable manufacturer I may sell without subjecting it to any
extended investigation unless there is some reason to suppose it is
defective. I do not know whether there may or may not be chattels
so dangerous that even a retailer would be under a duty of carefully
checking up."85
The presence of the word "extended" would seem to be significant in suggesting
that Mr. Bohlen believed that there was a duty to make some inspection. Likewise
the word "carefully" in his second sentence suggests that he was concerned, perhaps, not so much with the existence of the duty as with its extent. In any event,
his profession of uncertainty is double-edged; he was not certain one way or the
other. 86 Though it be of no moment, the impression I received from him, first as
a student and then as his assistant for three years, are that he believed that a vendor
does owe a duty to make a "reasonable" inspection of chattels offered for sale. In
the light of the doubt expressed by Mr. Bohlen in 1930, it would seem strange
that the blackletter provision of § 402 did not make actual knowledge a prerequisite for liability if such a rule had been intended. Assuredly Mr. Bohlen keenly
perceived the distinction between liability based upon actual knowledge and liability predicated upon the failure to make a "reasonable" inspection.
Doubt as to the meaning of the RESTATEMENT arises only because some of
the illustrations given under the pertinent sections involve vendors having knowledge of the facts which would make them suspect the existence of defects in the
chattels. Nevertheless it is significant that nowhere does the RESTATEMENT specifically deny the existence of the vendor's duty to make a reasonable inspection,
although it would have been a simple matter to frame a rule requiring actual
82

Section 399 states the liability for selling a chattel known to be dangerous.

S3RESTArEMENT, TORTS (1934)

84id. (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1930).

§402.

35(1930) 8 PRoc. A.L.I. 239. Italics added.
3CWhatever Mr. Bohlen's views when he wrote in 1905 (see BOHLEN, STUDIES IN Tril

LAW,

oF TORTS (1926) 67, 105), it would seem that at the time of his statement before the American
Law Institute in 1930 he was at least in doubt.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

'knowledge. Moreover, § 399 clearly provides that "a vendor of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who sells it knowing that it is, or is likely to be dangerous, is subject to liability .... ." If, as Mr. Eldredge suggests, § 402 should be
construed to impose liability only when the vendor has such actual knowledge,
§ 402 is obviously redundant. It is hardly conceivable that Mr. Bohlen or his
advisers intended to repeat the identical rule in two different sections.
One more argument, which Mr. Eldredge advances in favor of a rule requiring the vendor to have "actual knowledge" as a condition to liability, must be considered. He says:
"Further, the issue of the vendor's knowledge is easily understandable while a rule of law requiring inspection for observable defects
but not for unobservable defects draws a line very difficult of application. Does observable mean visible to the eye from the outside?
Does it mean observable only if you look for it seeking danger, or
observable by the casual glance given in the usual unpacking and
handling? Does it require the removal of easily removable parts to
see what is visible underneath? Does it mean visible as you view
the chattel from a normal standing or sitting posture or visible as you
get down and look all over it? Does it mean detectable by the sense
of feel, or smell, or hearing, or taste as well as sight? Must the
vendor look at, handle, smell, taste and listen to the chattel? Must
he palpate the chattel inside to feel the defect? Must he tap it with
a handy hammer to hear the defect? If an equally simple and not
inconvenient test, such as using litmus paper, will make the defect
observable by sight, as palpation makes it observable by feeling, is
this required?" 7
The difficulties posed by these questions seem awe-inspiring until it is recalled that
by far the greatest part of the law of negligence rests upon the conveniently vague
formula that the conduct required of members of society must conform to the
"standard of the reasonable man." In advance it is usually impossible to give legal
advice as to the precise forms of conduct required in order to avoid tort liability.
Cases in which the courts have prescribed specific standards for observance (like
those involving the "stop, look, and listen" rule) are comparatively rare. That
this is so is perhaps fortunate, for it permits a consideration of special facts and
conditions in particular cases which might otherwise be impossible.
It is not intended to suggest that burdens out of all proportion to possible
risks should be imposed upon vendors of chattels. It may be conceded that in
37EIdredge,. supra note 1, at 329, 330.

170
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many, if not most, cases the vendor, to use the language of the RESTATEMENT,
need not subject goods to "rigid inspection"3 8 but to one that is merely "cursory."3' 9
But why foreclose all possibility of imposing liability for failure to inspect, if the
equities in future cases so demand, by adopting an absolute, arbitrary rule that
there never need be any inspection? In view of the paucity of authority squarely
in point, may it not be wise to permit juries under the supervision of courts to set
up standards, from case to case, by which to gauge the "reasonableness" of the
vendor's inspection as fairness requires?
What has been said here may not be conclusive as to whether a duty should
be imposed to make any inspection. It is submitted, however, that neither the
cases to date nor the RESTATEMENT rule out such a duty, and that the arguments
advanced thus far against its imposition rest upon at least debatable grounds.
CARLISLE, PA., MARCH 15, 1941

3

8RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934)

39ibid.

§402. comment a.
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